[A]That kind of dominance creates a tension between property rights and antitrust(opposing or intended to restrain trusts, monop

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问题 [A]That kind of dominance creates a tension between property rights and antitrust(opposing or intended to restrain trusts, monopolies, or other large combinations of business and capital)principles. American competition authorities have been loth(unwilling)to compel dominant firms to grant rivals access to their private property, whether physical(as in the case of telecoms networks)or virtual(as with computer code). In their view intellectual-property rights have to be upheld to induce firms to innovate. Patents and copyrights are the rightful prize for new inventions. Trustbusters(a federal official who seeks to dissolve business trusts)should be wary of compelling firms to hand over their business secrets in the name of competition.
[B]Drawing on recent academic work, Mr Vickers makes the case for intervention on two counts. First, he outlines models that suggest a rival is less likely to develop new products if it cannot share in the profits from the dominant firm’s invention. If the leading firm is free to licence its technology on stringent terms, it curbs the profits of rivals who have to stump up. True, it spurs rival firms to innovate since the prospective pay-off is greater. But on balance, the incentive to innovate is greater where access is granted more freely, because upfront profits are more valuable.
[C]By contrast, Europe’s trustbusters have acted to free up access to telecoms networks in France and Germany. Backed by the courts, they have required Microsoft to make private information about its Windows operating system available to rivals, who can then compete more readily in software development.
[D]Economic policy is rarely uniform on either side of the Atlantic, but the differences in some cases are exaggerated or soon narrowed. That is true of antitrust policy, where there has been a great deal of convergence. The European Commission’s trustbusters tend to take a more cautious view of big global mergers, but the way such tie-ups are assessed is very similar to American practice. In the policing of cartels(an international combine formed esp. to regulate prices and output in some field of business), the commission has adopted many of the methods and models of its American cousins.
[E]Which view is right? In a new paper John Vickers of Oxford University surveys the economics literature and concludes that a hands-off approach is far from ideal. Mr Vickers, once head of the Office of Fair Trading, Britain’s main antitrust outfit, says that like many economists he finds himself "rowing in the mid-Atlantic" when it comes to the treatment of dominant firms. American policy is too cautious about treading on big firms’ toes but Europe’s trustbusters may intervene too boldly.
[F]A second argument for reining in dominant firms is that the contest to innovate tends to be keenest where there is a neck-and-neck battle to be the dominant firm. If market leaders are forced to license their know-how on easy terms, that reduces the pay-off from research and development(R&D). But it also allows much smaller firms to catch up quickly. Although profits from any new inventions will be lower, they will be chased more aggressively when competitors are on a similar footing.
[G]On one antitrust issue, though, the transatlantic gulf has been unusually wide: how to deal with firms with a market share so large as to dwarf their rivals. In high-tech industries, such as computing and telecoms, the power of network effects encourages firms to settle on an industry standard to ensure that gadgets and software are compatible. That gives the owners of the winning standards, such as Microsoft, a great deal of market muscle.
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答案B

解析 选项[B]承接上文[E]末尾部分给出的结论,指出原因有二,并分析了第一方面的原因。这也与文章末段开头“控制主导企业的第二个论点”相呼应,故为正确答案。
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