[A]The sort of faulty thinking called motivated reasoning also blocks our search for truth but advances arguments. For instance,

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问题 [A]The sort of faulty thinking called motivated reasoning also blocks our search for truth but advances arguments. For instance, we tend to look harder for flaws in a study when we don’t agree with its conclusions and are more critical of evidence that undermines our point of view. So birthers dismiss evidence offered by Hawaiian officials that Obama’s birth certificate is real, and death-penalty foes are adept at finding flaws in studies that conclude capital punishment deters crime. While motivated reasoning may cloud our view of reality and keep us from objectively assessing evidence, Mercier says, by letting us to accept flaws(real or not)in that evidence it prepares us to mount a destroying strategy in arguments.
[B]Another form of flawed reasoning shows up in logic puzzles. Consider the syllogism "No C are B; all B are A; therefore some A are not C. " Is it true? Fewer than 10 percent of us figure out that it is. One reason is that to evaluate its validity requires constructing counterexamples(finding an A that is a C, for instance). But finding counterexamples can, in general, invent our confidence in our own arguments.
[C]Women are bad drivers, Saddam plotted 9-11, Obama was not born in America, and Iraq had weapons of mass destruction: to believe any of these requires stopping some of our critical-thinking faculties and succumbing instead to the kind of irrationality that drives the logically minded crazy. It helps, for instance, to use confirmation bias. It also helps not to test your beliefs against empirical data; not to subject beliefs to the plausibility test; and to be guided by emotion.
[D]Even the sunk-cost fallacy, which has tripped up everyone from supporters of a losing war to a losing stock, reflects reasoning that turns its back on logic but wins arguments because the emotions it appeals to are universal. If Mercier is right, the sunk-cost fallacy, confirmation bias, and the other forms of irrationality will be with us as long as humans like to argue. That is, forever.
[E]An idea sweeping through the ranks of philosophers and cognitive scientists suggests why this is so. The reason we succumb to confirmation bias, why we are blind to counterexamples, and why we fall short of Cartesian logic in so many other ways is that these oversights have a purpose: they help us " invent and evaluate arguments that are intended to persuade other people," says psychologist Hugo Mercier of the University of Pennsylvania. Failures of logic, he propose, are in fact effective arms to win arguments. That puts poor reasoning in a completely different light. Arguing, after all, is less about seeking truth than about overcoming opposing views. So while confirmation bias, for instance, may mislead us about what’s true and real, by letting examples that support our view monopolize our memory and perception, it maximizes the arms we use when trying to convince someone that, say, he really is "late all the time. "
[F]Forms of reasoning that are good for solving problems and winning arguments lose out, over the course of evolution. In fact, rationality refers to the success of goal attainment, whatever those goals may be. Sometimes, rationality is equated with behavior that is self-interested to the point of being selfish. Sometimes rationality implies having complete knowledge about all the details of a given situation.
[G]The fact that humans are subject to all these failures of rational thought seems to make no sense. Reason is supposed to be the highest achievement of the human mind, and the route to knowledge and wise decisions. But as psychologists have been documenting since the 1960s, humans are really, really bad at reasoning. It’s not just that we follow our emotions so often, in contexts from voting to ethics. No, even when we intend to deploy the full force of our rational faculties, we often failed.
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答案B

解析 [E]项后面指出:证实性偏见(confirmation bias)会误导我们的是非观念,它使得那些支持我们观点的例子独占我们的记忆和视野,而前一句提到了poor reasoning,可见,证实性偏见属于一种形式的poor reasoning,综观剩下的选项,[B]项首句提到Another form of flawed reasoning,其中poor reasoning和flawed reasoning属于同义替换,因此[B]项应该在[E]项之后。
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