Most large corporations in the United States were once run by individual capitalists who owned enough stock to dominate the boar

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问题 Most large corporations in the United States were
once run by individual capitalists who owned enough
stock to dominate the board of directors and dictate
company policy. Because putting such large amounts of
(5) stock on the market would only depress its value, they
could not sell out for a quick profit and instead had to
concentrate on improving the long-term productivity of
their companies. Today, with few exceptions, the stock
of large United States corporations is held by large
(10) institutions-pension funds, for example-and because
these institutions are prohibited by antitrust laws from
owning a majority of a company’s stock and from
actively influencing a company’s decision-making, they
can enhance their wealth only by buying and selling
(15) stock in anticipation of fluctuations in its value. A
minority shareholder is necessarily a short term trader.
As a result, United States productivity is unlikely to
improve unless shareholders and the managers of the
companies in which they invest are encouraged to
(20) enhance long-term productivity (and hence long-term
profitability), rather than simply to maximize short-
term profits.
Since the return of the old-style capitalist is unlikely,
today’s short-term traders must be remade into
(25) tomorrow’s long-term capitalistic investors. The legal
limits that now prevent financial institutions from
acquiring a dominant shareholding position in a corpora-
tion should be removed, and such institutions encouraged
to take a more active role in the operations of the
(30) companies in which they invest. In addition, any institu-
tion that holds twenty percent or more of a company’s
stock should be forced to give the public one day’s
notice of the intent to sell those shares. Unless the
announced sale could be explained to the public on
(35) grounds other than anticipated future losses, the value of
the stock would plummet and, like the old-time capital-
ists, major investors could cut their losses only by
helping to restore their companies’ productivity. Such
measures would force financial institutions to become
(40) capitalists whose success depends not on trading shares
at the propitious moment, but on increasing the produc-
tivity of the companies in which they invest.

选项 A、Comparing two different approaches to a problem
B、Describing a problem and proposing a solution
C、Defending an established method
D、Presenting data and drawing conclusions from the data
E、Comparing two different analyses of a current situation

答案B

解析 This question asks you to determine the main task that the passage is designed to accomplish. The best answer is B. The passage identifies a problem (shareholder’ and manager’ failure to enhance companies’ long-term productivity) in the first paragraph, most pointedly in the last sentence of that paragraph. In the second paragraph, the author recommends certain actions as a means of solving that problem. Choice A is not correct. The author of the passage identifies a problem in the first paragraph, but the author does not compare two different approaches to that problem. Rather, in the second paragraph, the author proposes a single, unified approach to solving the problem. Choice C is incorrect. The author does not defend an established method of institutional shareholding in the United States and recommends a different method in the second paragraph. Choice D is also incorrect. The author describes a situation in the first paragraph but does not provide data or draw any conclusions from data. Choice E is not the correct answer. The author does not compare alternative analyses of the current situation discussed in the passage.
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