首页
外语
计算机
考研
公务员
职业资格
财经
工程
司法
医学
专升本
自考
实用职业技能
登录
外语
Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warming against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one st
Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warming against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one st
admin
2012-10-23
57
问题
Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warming against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one story fits all of Asia. This is, of course, silly: all of these economies plunged into economic crisis within a few months of each other, so they must have had something in common.
In fact, the logic of catastrophe was pretty much the same in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea. (Japan is a very different story.) In each case investors-mainly, but not entirely, foreign banks who had made short-term loans-all tried to pull their money out at the same time. The result was a combined banking and currency crisis a banking crisis because no bank can convert all its assets into cash on short notice; a currency crisis because panicked investors were trying not only to convert long-term assets into cash, but to concert baht or rupiah into dollars. In the face of the stampede, governments had no good options. If they let their currencies plunge, inflation would soar and companies that had borrowed in dollars would go bankrupt; if they tried to support their currencies by pushing up interest rates, the same firms would probable go bust from the combination of debt burden and recession. In practice, countries split the difference and paid a heavy price regardless.
Was the crisis a punishment for bad economic management? Like most clich6s, the catchphrase "crony capitalism" has prospered because it gets at something real; excessively cozy relationships between government and business really did lead to a lot of bad investments. The still primitive financial structure of Asian business also mad the economies peculiarly vulnerable to loss of confidence. But the punishment was surely disproportionate to the crime, and many investments that look foolish in retrospect seemed sensible at the time.
Given that there were no good policy options, was the policy response mainly on the right track? There was frantic blame-shifting when everything in Asia seemed to be going wrong: now there is a race to claim credit when some things have started to go right The International Monetary Fund points to Korea’s recovery-and more generally to the fact that the sky didn’t fall after all-as proof that its policy recommendations were right Never mind that other IMF clients have done far worse, and that the economy of Malaysia-which refused IMF help, and horrified respectable opinion by imposing capital controls-also seems to be on the mend; Malaysia’s Prime Minister, by contrast, claims full credit for any good news-even though neighboring economies also seem to have bottomed out
The truth is that an observer without any ax to grind would probably conclude that none of the policies adopted either on or in defiance of the IMF’s advice made much difference either way. Budget policies, interest ate policies, banking reform-whatever countries tried, just about all the capital that could flee, did. And when there was no more money to run, the natural recuperative powers of the economies finally began to prevail. At best, the money doctors who purported to offer cures provided a helpful bedside manner, at worst, they were like medieval physicians who prescribed bleeding as a remedy for all ills.
Will the patients stage a full recovery? It depends on exactly what you mean by "full". South Korea’s industrial production is already above its pre-crisis level, but in the spring of 1997 anyone who had predicted zero growth in Korea industry over the next two years would have been regarded as a reckless doomsayer. So if by recovery you mean not just a return to growth, but one that brings the region’s performance back to something like what people used to regard as the Asian norm, they have a long way to go.
The writer thinks that those Asian countries______.
选项
A、well deserved the punishment
B、invested in a senseless way at the time
C、were unduly punished in the crisis.
D、had bad relationships between government and business.
答案
C
解析
根据本文第三段后面的“But the punishment was surely disproportionate to the crime”可知,作者认为那些亚洲国家遭受的惩罚是过重的。
转载请注明原文地址:https://kaotiyun.com/show/cG9O777K
0
考博英语
相关试题推荐
Extraordinarycreativeactivityhasbeencharacterizedasrevolutionaryflyinginthefaceofwhatisestablishedandproducing
Beforethemid-nineteenthcentury,peopleintheUnitedStatesatemostfoodsonlyinseason.Drying,smoking,andsaltingcould
Beforethedisastrousearthquaketherewas______chaos.
Thinkofallthecriminalswhohavekilled,allthesoldierswhohavekilled;considerthemassmurderofJewsinNaziGermany.
Thisbookshouldbewell-recommendedwithinthe______ofanyonewhohasstudiedGermanforfouryears.
Johnisvery______;evenasachild,heconstantlyaskedquestions.
Becauseofitsexcellenceinquality,forthelasttwoyears,Audicarhas______Germany’sToutingCarChampionship.
DanisHayesraisedtheessentialparadoxandaskedhowpeoplecouldhavefoughtsohardagainstenvironmentaldegradation______
Theconceptofpersonalchoiceinrelationtohealthbehaviorsisanimportantone.Anestimated90percentofallillnessesmay
Forgatheringdataaboutindividualsorgroupsatdifferentdevelopmentallevels,researcherscanusetwo.relatedresearchdesi
随机试题
对独立性威胁的防范措施可以分为三类,其中会计师事务所维护独立性的总体防范措施主要包括()
A.精氨酸B.人工肝C.二者均是D.二者均非(2003年)治疗慢性肝性脑病用
居住在甲市A区的乔小伟从事汽车修理业,其所开的汽车修理铺位于甲市C区。该汽车修理铺的个体工商户营业执照所登记的业主是其兄乔大伟居住在甲市B区,乔大伟实际上并不经营汽车修理。乔小伟为了承揽更多的业务,与乡办集体企业正华汽车修理厂位于甲市L县签定了一份协
汛期来临,漏洞险情发生时,塞堵()是最有效、最常用的方法。
甲公司系2008年12月成立的股份有限公司,对所得税采用资产负债表债务法核算,适用的企业所得税税率为25%,计提的各项资产减值准备均会产生暂时性差异,当期发生的可抵扣暂时性差异预计能够在未来期间转回。甲公司每年末按净利润的10%计提法定盈余公积。(1)甲公
债券按支付利息的形式不同分为()。
净现值率与净现值的主要区别是()。
小红和小强同时从家里出发相向而行。小红每分钟走52米,小强每分钟走70米,二人在途中的A处相遇。若小红提前4分钟出发,且速度不变,小强每分钟走90米,则两人仍在A处相遇。小红和小强两人的家相距多少米?()
AtosendgoodstovariouspartsoftheworldBatanytimeduringtheyearChasgreatlypromotedtradeDisitpossibletopro
Lastyear,thecrimerateinChicagohassharply______.
最新回复
(
0
)