首页
外语
计算机
考研
公务员
职业资格
财经
工程
司法
医学
专升本
自考
实用职业技能
登录
外语
Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warning against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one st
Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warning against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one st
admin
2010-03-25
50
问题
Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warning against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one story fits all of Asia. This is, of course, silly. all of these economies plunged into economic crisis within a few months of each other, so they must have had something in common.
In fact, the logic of catastrophe was pretty much the same in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea. (Japan is a very different story. ) In each case investors -- mainly, but not entirely, foreign banks who had made short-term loans -- all tried to pull their money out at the same time. The result was a Combined banking and currency crisis: a banking crisis because no bank can convert all its assets into cash on short notice; a currency crisis because panicked investors were trying not only to convert long term assets into cash, but to convert baht or rupiah into dollars. In the face of the stampede, governments had no good options. If they let their currencies plunge, inflation would soar and companies that had borrowed in dollars would go bankrupt; if they tried to support their currencies by pushing up interest rates, the same firms would probably go bust from the combination of debt burden and recession. In practice, countries split the difference -- and paid a heavy price regardless.
Was the crisis a punishment for bad economic management? Like most cliches, the catchphrase "crony capitalism" has prospered because it gets at something real: excessively cozy relationships between government and business really did lead to a lot of bad investments. The still primitive financial structure of Asian business also made the economies peculiarly vulnerable to a loss of confidence. But the punishment was surely disproportionate to the crime, and many investments that look foolish in retrospect seemed sensible at the time.
Given that there were no good policy options, was the policy response mainly on the right track? There was frantic blame-shifting when everything in Asia seemed to be going wrong; now there is a race to claim credit when some things have started to go right. The International Monetary Fund points to Korea’s recovery -- and more generally to the fact that the sky didn’t fall after all -- as proof that its policy recommendations were right. Never mind that other IMF clients have done far worse, and that the economy of Malaysia- which refused IMF help, and horrified respectable opinion by imposing capital controls -- also seems to be on the mend. Malaysia’s Prime Minister, by contrast, claims full credit for any good news -- even though neighbouring economies also seem to have bottomed out.
The truth is that an observer without any ax to grind would probably conclude that none of the policies adopted either on or in defiance Of the IMF’s advice made much difference either way. Budget policies, interest rate policies, banking reform -- whatever countries tried, just about all the capital that could flee, did. And when there was no more money to run, the natural recuperative powers of the economies finally began to prevail. At best, the money doctors who purported to offer cures provided a helpful bedside manner; at worst, they were like medieval physicians who. prescribed bleeding as a remedy for all ills.
Will the patients stage a full recovery? It depends on exactly what you mean by "full". South Korea’s industrial production is already above its pre-crisis level; but in the spring of 1997 anyone who had predicted zero growth in Korean industry over the next two years would have been regarded as a reckless doomsayer. So if by recovery you mean not just a return to growth, but one that brings the region’s performance back to something like what people used to regard as the Asian norm, they have a long way to go.
"Pundits" in the first paragraph is closest in meaning to
选项
A、economists.
B、bankers.
C、industrialists.
D、financiers.
答案
A
解析
这是道词汇推断题。根据上下文,pundits在文中指经济学家。
转载请注明原文地址:https://kaotiyun.com/show/gEqO777K
0
专业英语八级
相关试题推荐
A、Theyoffertheiremployeesmoreflexibility.B、Theygavetheiremployeesariseinsalary.C、Theyprovidebetterworkingsurro
Scienceisadominantthemeinourculture.Sinceittouchesalmosteveryfacetofourlife,educatedpeople,needatleastsome
Yetthedifferenceintoneandlanguagemuststrikeus,sosoonasitisphilosophythatspeaks:thatchangeshouldremindusth
Withbighandbagsbecomingakeyfashionaccessoryforworkingwomen,healthexpertsarewarningtheycanalsobecomeakeyheal
A、She’dbeabletoleavequickly.B、She’dbelessnervous.C、She’dbeabletolocatewherethemanwasseated.D、She’dknowwhen
A、Theweatheriswarmonthecoast.B、Theweatheraffectstheoperationgreatly.C、It’sextremeweatherconditionsthatmakeexp
IagreetosomeextentwithmyimaginaryEnglishreader.Americanliteraryhistoriansareperhapspronetoviewtheirownnation
Howmanyreallysufferasaresultoflabormarketproblems?Thisisoneofthemostcriticalyetcontentioussocialpolicyques
A、Researchershavefoundthatcookedtomatoesaremorenutritious.B、Fiftypercentofmenwilldevelopprostatecancerwhenthey
Thesedayssearchingforanumber【C1】______telephonedirectoryseemsveryold-fashioned.Voicerecognitionsystemsarebecoming
随机试题
资产负债表项目的质量分析不包括()。
下列禁止进入中药材专业市场的中药材是
在委托诉讼中,需要委托人特别授权的事项有( )。
下列有关同一控制下企业合并形成的长期股权投资初始投资成本的表述中,正确的是()。
我国三大平原不包括()。
构成法律的基本单位是()
论软件可靠性评价软件可靠性评价是指选用和建立合适的可靠性数学模型,运用统计技术和其他手段,对软件可靠性测试和系统运行期间的软件失效数据(也可能包含软件生命周期内其他可靠性数据)进行处理,并评估和预测软件可靠性的过程。软件可靠性评价是软件可靠性
AcademicMobilityScholarsandstudentshavealwaysbeengreattravelers."Academicmobility"isnowoftenstatedasafunda
The______crownjewelsarekeptintheTowerofLondon.
Singaporeisoneoftheworld’ssmallestcountriesbutitisalsooneofthemostsuccessfulcountries.Itseconomicgrowthhas
最新回复
(
0
)