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  3. When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why tha

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why tha

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问题    When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. 【F1】To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG) (最后通牒游戏), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. 【F2】However, the distinction between kin and non-kin—with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption—is often neglected when deriving the "optimal" strategy.
   In the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game (UG), two players—a proposer and a responder—are tasked with an economic decision. First, the proposer suggests how to split a resource. This resource, provided by a third party, is set to 1.0. The offer defines the fraction that the proposer is willing to give to the responder. If the offer meets the responder’s demands, the resource will be split accordingly. If the offer is rejected, neither player will receive anything. The rational and most optimal strategy in this game differs markedly from the strategy observed in humans. This gap has been explained by showing that humans take other elements, such as the social context, into account when making decisions. 【F3】It comes to a conclusion that allowing players to discern between opponents that are kin and opponents that are not kin leads to the evolution of strategies that resemble those observed in humans—even if kinship detection is imperfect.
   To understand the evolution of strategies, a computational evolutionary mode was used to define a population of strategies as a set of points within the strategy space. We randomly selected a set of strategies to form the population of the first generation. 【F4】These selected strategies all played against each other, and not against every possible strategy—much as an organism does not interact with all other possible organisms, but only with those alive at the time. The next generation was formed from those strategies that earned a higher payoff playing the UG. Specifically, the probability of an organism having offspring was defined by the payoff it received divided by the total payoff the entire population received. However, variations could move the points defining the offspring’s strategy around in this space, providing a new set of opponents. 【F5】How this set of points moved through this space over time approximated how evolution would act on organisms whose existence depended solely on playing the UG.
【F4】
选项
答案让选出的这些策略两两对战，但并非和所有有可能的策略一一对战——这很像有机体不会和其他所有可能存在的有机体进行互动，而只会和当时还活着的有机体互动。
解析 ①本句为主从复合句，破折号前的部分为主句，破折号后的部分为as引导的从句，主句描述的是过去进行的实验的现象，故时态为一般过去时；从旬描述的为客观事实，故时态用了一般现在时。②all是These selected strategies的同位语，两者指代的内容一样；not against every possible strategy中，against前省略了动词played，虽然前后是用并列连词and连接的，但是这里前后说的是两种不同的情形，所以在翻译时处理为前后转折关系。as“正如，就像”引导的从句为方式状语从句，由于放在破折号之后，就具有了插入语的性质，作用是对主句的进一步解释说明；代词those指代的内容为those organisms；alive at the time为后置定语，修饰those。
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