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  3. When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why tha

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why tha

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问题    When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. 【F1】To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG) (最后通牒游戏), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. 【F2】However, the distinction between kin and non-kin—with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption—is often neglected when deriving the "optimal" strategy.
   In the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game (UG), two players—a proposer and a responder—are tasked with an economic decision. First, the proposer suggests how to split a resource. This resource, provided by a third party, is set to 1.0. The offer defines the fraction that the proposer is willing to give to the responder. If the offer meets the responder’s demands, the resource will be split accordingly. If the offer is rejected, neither player will receive anything. The rational and most optimal strategy in this game differs markedly from the strategy observed in humans. This gap has been explained by showing that humans take other elements, such as the social context, into account when making decisions. 【F3】It comes to a conclusion that allowing players to discern between opponents that are kin and opponents that are not kin leads to the evolution of strategies that resemble those observed in humans—even if kinship detection is imperfect.
   To understand the evolution of strategies, a computational evolutionary mode was used to define a population of strategies as a set of points within the strategy space. We randomly selected a set of strategies to form the population of the first generation. 【F4】These selected strategies all played against each other, and not against every possible strategy—much as an organism does not interact with all other possible organisms, but only with those alive at the time. The next generation was formed from those strategies that earned a higher payoff playing the UG. Specifically, the probability of an organism having offspring was defined by the payoff it received divided by the total payoff the entire population received. However, variations could move the points defining the offspring’s strategy around in this space, providing a new set of opponents. 【F5】How this set of points moved through this space over time approximated how evolution would act on organisms whose existence depended solely on playing the UG.
【F5】
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答案这组分数在这个空间内随时间浮动的方式与进化对完全以玩最后通牒游戏为生的有机体产生影响的方式接近。
解析 ①本句为多重复合句，描述的是过去发生的实验中的现象，故基本时态为一般过去时。②How this set．．．time作主句的主语；how evolution．．．作主句的宾语；whose引导定语从句，修饰先行词organisms，指“完全以玩最后通牒游戏为生的有机体”。③副词solely修饰动词depended，说明有机体完全以……为生；动名词短语playing the UG作介词on的宾语。④approximate作动词时，意为resemble“与……接近”；短语act on意为“对……产生影响”；depend on意为“依靠，依赖”。
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