首页
外语
计算机
考研
公务员
职业资格
财经
工程
司法
医学
专升本
自考
实用职业技能
登录
外语
Talk is cheap when it comes to solving the problem of too-big-to-fail banks. From the luxury of even today’s stuttering economic
Talk is cheap when it comes to solving the problem of too-big-to-fail banks. From the luxury of even today’s stuttering economic
admin
2015-01-09
42
问题
Talk is cheap when it comes to solving the problem of too-big-to-fail banks. From the luxury of even today’s stuttering economic recovery it is easy to vow that next time lenders’ losses will be pushed onto their creditors, not onto taxpayers.
But cast your mind back to late 2008. Then, the share prices of the world’s biggest banks could halve in minutes. Reasonable people thought that many firms were hiding severe losses. Anyone exposed to them, from speculators to churchgoing custodians of widows’ pensions, tried to yank their cash out, causing a run that threatened another Great Depression. Now, imagine being sat not in the observer’s armchair but in the regulator’s hot seat and faced with such a crisis again. Can anyone honestly say that they would let a big bank go down?
And yet, somehow, that choice is what the people redesigning the rules of finance must try to make possible. The final rules are due in November and will probably call for banks in normal times to carry core capital of at least 10% of risk-adjusted assets. This would be enough to absorb the losses most banks made during 2007-2009 with a decent margin for error.
But that still leaves the outlier banks that in the last crisis, as in most others, lost two to three times more than the average firm. Worse, the crisis has shown that if they are not rescued they can topple the entire system. That is why swaggering talk of letting them burn next time is empty. Instead, a way needs to be found to impose losses on their creditors without causing a wider panic - the financial equivalent of squaring a circle.
America has created a resolution authority that will take over failing banks and force losses on unsecured creditors if necessary. That is a decent start, but may be too indiscriminate. The biggest banks each have hundreds of billions of dollars of such debt, including overnight loans from other banks, short-term paper sold to money-market funds and bonds held by pension funds. Such counterparties are likely to run from any bank facing a risk of being put in resolution—which, as the recent crisis showed, could mean most banks. Indeed, the unsecured Adebt market is so important that far from destabilising it, regulators might feel obliged to underwrite it, as in 2008.
A better alternative is to give regulators draconian power but over a smaller part of banks’ balance-sheets, so that the panic is contained. The idea is practical since it means amending banks’ debt structures, not reinventing them, although banks would need roughly to double the amount of this debt that they hold. It also avoids too-clever-by-half trigger mechanisms and the opposite pitfall of a laborious legal process. Indeed, it is conceivable that a bank could be recapitalised over a weekend.
The banks worry there are no natural buyers for such securities, making them expensive to issue. In fact they resemble a bog-standard insurance arrangement in which a premium is received and there is a small chance—of perhaps one in 50 each year—of severe losses. Regulators would, though, have to ensure that banks didn’t buy each other’s securities and that they didn’t all end up in the hands of one investor. Last time round American International Group became the dumping ground for Wall Street’s risk and had to be bailed out too.
Would it work? The one thing certain about the next crisis is that it will feature the same crushing panic, pleas from banks and huge political pressure to stabilise the system, whatever the cost. The hope is that regulators might have a means to impose losses on the private sector in a controlled way, and not just face a binary choice between bail-out or oblivion.
The government can’t take bank crisis for granted mainly because
选项
A、it may lead to the incredible damage.
B、it may cause a wider panic.
C、banks lose more than average firms.
D、it often happens during depression.
答案
A
解析
推断题。由题干定位至第四段第三句。该句提到,这就是为什么我们说让(银行)自生自灭是句空话,也就是说,我们不能对银行的危机置之不理。联系前一句可知:如果不挽救银行,那么银行的危机将会搅乱整个金融系统,因此[A]正确。
转载请注明原文地址:https://kaotiyun.com/show/H8dO777K
0
专业英语八级
相关试题推荐
AcoupleofyearsagoagroupofmanagementscholarsfromYaleandtheUniversityofPittsburghtriedtodiscoveriftherewasa
Earlyanthropologists,followingthetheorythatwordsdeterminethought,believedthatlanguageanditsstructurewereentirel
Notlongbefore,somemunicipalgovernmentsissuedanewregulationonthemanagementoflostitems.Itgoeslikethis:ifnoon
AccordingtoarecentregulationissuedbytheMinistryofHealth,smokingwillbebannedinallenclosedpubliclocationsinCh
AnAmericansurveyhasshownthateachyeareveryemployedpersonlosesthreetofourworkingdaysfromcoldsandalliedcomplai
In1932,inthedepthofthedepression,theAmericanpeoplechose______astheirnextpresidentwhopromiseda"newdeal"tog
TheOriginofMoney Intheearlieststagesofman’sdevelopmenthehadnomoreneedofmoneythananimalshave.Hewascontent
PresidentLincolnissuedtheEmancipationProclamationinSeptember1862,because______.
JobInterviewsAjobinterviewistheopportunityforyoutoshowyourself,soitisessentialtomakegoodpreparations.In
徐霞客一生周游考察了16个省,足迹几乎遍及全国。他在考察的过程中,从来不盲目迷信书本上的结论。他发现前人研究地理的记载有许多不是很可靠的地方。为了进行真实细致的考察,他很少乘车坐船,几乎全靠双脚翻山越岭,长途跋涉;为了弄清大自然的真相,他总是挑选道路艰险的
随机试题
在常压下苯的沸点为80.1℃,环己烷的沸点为80.73℃,欲使该两组分混合物得到分离,则宜采用()。
简述数据库系统的三级模式两级映像。
脊髓前角内的神经元主要为________,体积大小不一,大的称________,分布到骨骼肌的梭外肌,支配骨骼肌运动;小的称________,支配肌梭内的肌纤维,调节肌张力。后角内的神经元类型较复杂,主要接受后根________的中枢突传入的神经冲动。
有关延迟性心因性反应,不正确的是
预防新生儿破伤风的主要措施是
患者,女性,66岁,诊断为尿毒症,精神不振,下腹无胀满,24h尿量为80ml。护士判断该患者的排尿情况属于
下列情况的泡沫液需要送检的是()。
报上登出了国内20家大医院的名单,名单按它们在近3年中病人死亡率的高低排序。专家指出不能把名单排列的顺序作为评价这些医院的医疗水平的一个标准。以下各项如果是真的,都能作论据支持专家的结论,除了()。
Whyhasthemancontactedthewoman?
AtopracehorsewasbroughtdownatRoyalAscotwithashotfromahigh-techsoundgun,acourtwastoldyesterday.Thegunwas
最新回复
(
0
)